Deep-lomacy #10

Russia’s cultural diplomacy in the post-Soviet space: hegemonic practices of a former ruler? \ Domenico Valenza, PhD Fellow, United Nations University and Ghent University

“At the current critical stage in world order, and especially in the context of efforts to actively counter propaganda campaigns under the slogan of ‘containing’ Russia, cultural diplomacy is becoming increasingly important”. As this quote from the International Cultural Cooperation policy highlights, in recent years Russian authorities have increasingly looked to culture and cultural diplomacy as tools to strengthen the country’s international influence. In 2012, President Putin stressed the importance of culture as a tool allowing Russia “to become a great power. We remember this and we must effectively use our humanitarian resources and increase international interest in our history, traditions, language, and cultural values”.​

Importantly, culture’s place in foreign affairs is not unknown in Moscow. Foreign activities in the cultural realm date back at least to the Cold War, when persuasion and messaging were considered fundamental to counter rivals and prevent military escalation. The idea was that, as soon as foreign audiences were shown positive images of an international actor, they would be able to pressure their government and shape policy changes. For this reason, Moscow considered cultural diplomacy to be a primary weapon in the strategic struggle between superpowers.

But Russia’s great power approach did not last long. In fact, 1990s witnessed the country’s major withdrawal from foreign policy ambitions. This was especially the case in the post-Soviet region, an area that Russia considered, not without legitimate concerns from local populations, within its own sphere of influence. As a countermove, from the mid-2000s and in response to the so-called ‘colour revolutions’, Russia attempted to re-engage regionally and counter the increased presence of Western actors. The identification of this priority came with the recognition that Russia had failed to engage properly in this area after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The cultural sphere, referred to as part of ‘humanitarian cooperation’, became a key area of cooperation in the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Russia’s policy engagement was coupled with a new institutional design and the creation of a number of agencies that could enhance bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the region. Among the cultural diplomacy institutions and agencies, we can consider the Federal Agency Rossotrudnichestvo (2008), the network of the Russian Centres of Science and Culture (2008), the Intergovernmental Foundation for Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Cooperation (IFESCCO, 2006), and the Russian World Foundation (2007).

Rossotrudnichestvo is today Russia’s major foreign actor in the area of culture. The agency comes from the transformation of the Russian Centre for International Scientific and Cultural Cooperation, which was in turn the heir of the All-Union Society of Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries. In order to advance bilateral cooperation, the agency acts as an umbrella for Russian centres for science and culture. In 2018, 62 states hosted the 72 existing centres. Although they include the word ‘science’ in their name, science and technology are not the main area of work, while their primary focus is on the dissemination of Russian language and the organisation of compatriots’ activities. In this perspective they operate as “cultural centres, in the usual diplomatic sense”.

Russia’s cultural diplomacy has also been supported through intergovernmental cooperation and particularly in the framework of the CIS. IFESCCO was created in 2006 by the Council of the Heads of Governments of the CIS. Its funding relies substantially on Russia’s donations, which accounted for more than 70 per cent of total envelope in 2017. The ‘CIS Capital of Culture’ is a good example of cultural initiatives supported by IFESCCO. The programme mimics the European Community’s proposal launched in 1985.

In addition to official channels, Russia has also relied on several government-sponsored institutions. Set up in 2007 through presidential decree, the Russian World Foundation (Russky Mir) is today the most important of these actors and promotes the popularisation of Russian language and culture. In the post-Soviet region, the foundation has developed partnerships with educational institutions and supported local actors through its grant program. Examples of funded organisations are research centres, language schools, and cultural organisations.

Russia’s cultural diplomacy in the post-Soviet region enjoys several advantages. The Russian language remains a key factor for successful work: despite a predictable decline, Russia can still capitalise on local populations’ fluency in many countries. The presence of an audience with exposure to and interest in Russian cultural products make the post-Soviet region a suitable space to run ad hoc initiatives. Also, educational opportunities in Russia or in foreign-based campuses of Russian universities put Moscow in a more comfortable position.

In spite of these important assets, several shortcomings can be found in Russia’s cultural diplomacy. First, its cultural paradigm remains strictly ‘civilisational’ and built to satisfy domestic appetites for foreign influence. This in turn creates scepticism in third countries and fosters readings of Moscow’s ‘soft’ policies as hegemonic attempts of the former imperial ruler. Second, and a consequence of the first, Russia’s institutional model provides little to no opportunities to engage with Russian and local civil societies, in what should be an attempt to enhance people-to-people bonds. Russia does not seem willing to co-create culture with local authorities and operators on an equal footing. While there is no doubt that political priorities always matter in foreign policy, in Russia’s case they seem to dwarf cultural activities and frustrate spaces for meaningful cooperation. In the end, only a balanced and mutual approach can defuse the scepticism of elites and the general audience in the post-Soviet region, and open new spaces for enhanced and longstanding cultural cooperation.

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Domenico Valenza is a PhD Fellow at the United Nations University and Ghent University. His area of expertise includes EU affairs, Russia’s foreign policy, cultural relations, and discourse analysis. He holds a MA in European Studies from Université Paris 8 Saint Denis and Université libre de Bruxelles (ULB), a MSc in Russian Politics from King’s College London, and a BA in Communication Studies from Università degli Studi di Catania. Prior to joining UNU-CRIS and Ghent University, he worked at No Peace Without Justice as a program officer, and at the College of Europe as a Senior Academic Assistant.