Deep-lomacy #13

Chinese Stadium Diplomacy in Africa / Dr. Itamar Dubinsky, Visiting Assistant Professor at Oregon State University, USA

There is a long tradition of integrating sports in diplomatic efforts. Since the seventh century BCE, ancient Greek cities would declare a holy truce to ensure the safe arrival and departure of athletes to the Olympic Games. In modern times, governments have adopted sports as a diplomatic tool that enable them to emphasize national identities, promote policies aimed at bringing them closer, or put pressure on each other. In recent decades, scholars began conceptualizing such practices as sports diplomacy (Murray and Pigman 2014). In the Chinese context, the cultural bridge that basketball player Yao Ming built between China and the USA, and the hosting of the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, which contributed to the country’s global status, depicted the contributions of sports diplomacy. At the same time, sports diplomacy can mask human rights violations. Public criticisms on the Chinese persecution of Tibetans and the Chinese backing of Sudan's regime despite its systematic killing of Darfuri people were softened during the Olympic Games.

Another expression of Chinese sports diplomacy is visible in recent daces through the building of sports stadiums in Africa, by state-owned enterprises. The cost of each project is estimated at dozens of millions of dollars, a fee that China gives as a grant or a soft loan. Recently, scholars examining this trend began conceptualizing it as “stadium diplomacy” (Chadwick 2017; Dubinsky 2021; Ross 2014; Will 2012). Doing so contributes to a more nuanced understanding of the ways in which soft and hard power intertwine and reflect through smart power (Wilson 2008, 11). China’s soft power in Africa is projected through its values, policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, accelerated industrialization and serving as a role model for some authoritarian regimes. China’s hard policy is embodied through its economic incentives.

The construction of stadiums is aimed at guaranteeing China’s gain access to raw materials to feed its industry. As Flowers argues, “construction via stadium diplomacy almost always happens in concert with formalization of trade agreements with the host nations, generally focused on ensuring Chinese access to natural resources in those nations” (2017, 104). Furthermore, Chinese stadium diplomacy provides employment for the Chinese workforce, promotes the status of Chinese sporting activities (Wushu) and posits China as an influential actor in the development world. According to Xue et al., such endeavors function as “a lubricant of diplomacy that guaranteed the smooth conduct of international affairs” (2019, 2). These goals find expression in the agenda of China’s President Xi Jinping, who often ties China’s development with the development of its counterparts.

African countries accept China's grants and loans because they enable governments to initiate development schemes that otherwise would not have been possible due to budget restraints and the stipulating policies of Western financial institutions (Tanzania). Furthermore, owing to the stadiums, African countries can host big sporting events (Ghana), increase the number of citizens involved in professional sports (Angola), offer a safer environment for spectators (Zambia), maintain traditional sporting activities with local significance (Senegal), promote peace building efforts (Liberia), and create more jobs (Ethiopia). Nevertheless, the stadiums’ trickle-down effect is limited in its scope, given that most workforce and construction materials come from China. Also, their usage is meager given that their necessity often stems from personal aspirations of the leader to promote his status (Gabon). The efficiency of Africans to resist those endeavors is limited due to the institutions’ support of China.
Chinese stadium diplomacy opens new avenues for China and African countries while simultaneously maintaining existing hierarchies given that African governments remain largely dependent on external factors for funding and implementation of development schemes. Furthermore, the building of stadiums for personal purposes attests to a contradiction in the Chinese development and non-interference policy. China regards development as a prime goal, yet it supports several authoritarian regimes (Gabon and Angola) that consistently violate human rights issues, thus hampering the development efforts of such countries. In the wake of such contradictions, and given that China cooperates with dictators who do not put the wellbeing of their citizens at the front, Taylor warns that China’s development policy sabotages its own development goals. The Chinese stadiums in Africa provide a vivid example of such contradictions.